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In re N, Juvenile Court Must Inform
Minor of His Right to Appeal
Ever since the United States Supreme Court's decision in In Re
Gault,' the Juvenile Court System in California has been undergoing
reform at an ever-accelerating rate.2 Although Justice Fortas, in
Gault, expressed his opinion that the Juvenile Courts need not be-
come mirror images of the adult penal system,3 where procedures
have been challenged, the appellate courts have been quick to adopt
those procedures used in adult proceedings under the general crim-
inal law.4 In Re N5 is representative of this approach. The issue
raised was whether or not the failure of a Juvenile Court to inform
the juvenile of his right to appeal, his right to have appointed coun-
sel if indigent, his right to a free transcript if indigent and the pro-
cedures for filing an appeal, violated the minor's right to equal
protection under the law. The minor, N, made an attempt to obtain
an order allowing him to file a late appeal. Failing this, he raised
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. See, e.g., In re William F., Sup. Ct. No. 87581 (April 17, 1974) (juve-
nile's counsel has right to make closing argument); Bryan v. Superior
Court, 7 Cal. 3d 578, 498 P.2d 1079, 102 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1972) (juvenile's
admissions made to juvenile court judge and probation officer inadmissible
in trial as an adult); Dana J. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 836, 484 P.2d 595,
94 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1971) (juvenile has right to free transcripts on appeal
if he is personally unable to afford counsel; In re J., 26 Cal. App.3d 768,
103 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1972) (juvenile entitled to "fair notice" of charges); In
re Gladys R., 1 Cal.3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970) (judge
may not read a juvenile's "social report" before the jurisdictional hearing);
In re Paul T., 15 Cal. App.3d 886, 93 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1971) (juvenile has
right to counsel; he must make a "knowing waiver" of right to remain si-
lent; cases must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Corey, 266
Cal. App.2d 295, 72 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1968) (probation report prejudicial and
inadmissible at jurisdictional hearing); People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 432
P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967) (dissenting opinion of Justice Peters).
3. 387 U.S. at 30; McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
4. E.g., Bryan v. Superior Court, 7 Cal.3d 575, 498 P.2d 1079, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 831 (1972), People v. Hicks, 4 Cal.3d 757, 484 P.2d 65, 94 Cal. Rptr.
393 (1971) and People v. Harrington, 2 Cal.3d 991, 471 P.2d 961, 88 Cal.
Rptr. 161 (1970).
5. 36 Cal. App. 3d 935, 112.Cal. Rptr. 89 (1974).
the issue in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus." The writ was
issued on the grounds that the Juvenile Court's failure to so inform
the minor denied him equal protection under the law. 7
In May, 1972, the minor was arrested for robbery.8 A petition
was filed with the Juvenile Court, describing him as a person within
section 602 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code.9 The
allegations were denied at the pre-trial stage, and the matter was
set for a contested jurisdictional hearing on June 2.10 Because the
minor qualified as an indigent, he was represented by a Deputy
Public Defender. At the jurisdictional hearing, the petition was
sustained as to all allegations. The dispositional hearing was held
on June 21, 1972, at which time the juvenile was committed to the
California Youth Authority.
The Juvenile Court did not inform the minor that he had a right
to appeal, nor was there any evidence that he was informed by his
counsel, or his probation officer.1 ' Hence, no notice of appeal was
filed by or on behalf of the minor. In September, 1972, the juvenile
learned from an attorney at the Youth Law Center in San Francisco
that his case could be appealed. On October 5, a notice of appeal
was filed, being received by the County Clerk on October 11. The
Clerk did not file the notice but stamped it "Received but not filed"
6. In re Benoit, 10 Cal.3d 72, 78, 514 P.2d 97, 100, 109 Cal. Rptr. 785,
788 (1973) (habeas corpus is the proper remedy where a motion for an or-
der to permit the filing of a late appeal is not available).
7. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 940, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE, § 211 (West 1970).
9. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 650 (West 1972):
A proceeding in the juvenile court to declare a minor a ward or a
dependent child of the court is commenced by the filing with the
court, by the probation officer, of a petition, in conformity with the
requirements of the article.
CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE, § 653 (West 1972):
Whenever any person applies to the probation officer to commence
proceedings in the juvenile court, such application shall be in the
form of an affidavit alleging that there was or is within the
county, or residing therein, a minor within the provisions of Sec-
tions 600, 601 or D02 or that a minor committed an offense de-
scribed in Section 662 within the county and setting forth the
facts in support thereof....
CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE, § 602 (West Supp. 1974):
Any person under the age of 18 years who violates any law of this
state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county
of this state defining crime . . . is within the jurisdiction of thejuvenile court, which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the
court.
10. There is generally no arraignment or preliminary hearing in juvenile
court. Cases are set on two calendars: pre-trial, to allow bargaining and
out-of-court dispositions and trial for contested matters not disposed of dur-
ing pre-trial.
11. 36 Cal. App.3d at 938, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 90; CAL. WELF. AND INST.
CODE, § 800 (West 1972). See Cal. Ct. R. 250 (1972).
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because the sixty (60) day filing period had long since elapsed. 12
The minor's new attorney filed a notice of motion for order to file
a late appeal with the Superior Court on October 19, 1972. After a
hearing on the motion, the Court granted it and ordered the Clerk to
file the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal, along with the
recordof the jurisdictional and dispositional hearings was filed with
the District Court of Appeals. However, on its own motion, the
Court of Appeals vacated both the filing and the order because the
Superior Court lacked jurisdiction.
In desperation, the minor filed a writ of habeas corpus on March
13, 1973. The Superior Court denied the writ and the minor ap-
pealed from that ruling.
The California Rules of Court, Rule 250, requires that
"After imposing sentence in a criminal case upon conviction after
trial, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal from
the judgment, of the necessary steps and time for taking an appeal
and of the right of an indigent defendant to have counsel appointed
by the reviewing court."'13 [Emphasis added]
At the time of the juvenile's jurisdictional and dispositional hearings
there was no requirement under the Juvenile Law that a minor be
informed in the same manner. For that matter, there was no re-
quirement that he be informed at all. Thus, the issue is whether or
not this procedure denies the juvenile equal protection of the law.
Section 800 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code pro-
vides that a juvenile who has been found to be a person described
in Section 602 has the right to appeal.14 The United States Supreme
Court has held that a state is not required to provide an appellant
process; but, if a state does provide such a process, it must be kept
free of unreasonable distinctions which may impede the open access
to the courts.'5 This right to appeal, once established, is a funda-
12. Cal. Ct. R. 31(a) (1972), amending .Cal. Ct. R. 31(a) (1961).
13. Cal. Ct. R. 250 (1972); 36 Cal.3d at 939, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
14. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE, § 800 (West 1972):
A judgment or decree of a juvenile court . . . assuming jurisdiction
and declaring any person to be a person described in Section ...
602 .. .may be appealed from in the same manner as any finaljudgment, and any subsequent order may be appealed from as from
an order after judgment ....
15. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966).
mental right!8 and thus it may not be abridged by the state unless
it can establish a compelling interest.17 Furthermore, the state must
also establish "that the distinctions drawn by the regulation are
necessary to further its purpose.""' The burden is upon the State to
demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in refusing to have a
juvenile appraised of his right to appeal, and that such denial serves
the purpose of the Juvenile Court Process.
For years the Juvenile Court Process has been considered civil in
nature.19 The policy was that the juvenile was not being punished
but given the opportunity to rehabilitate himself. There was wide-
spread belief that an informal proceeding without the clash and
clamor of a court of law would be a progressive approach. Thus, in
In Re N, the Attorney General argued that Rule 250 should be
restricted in its application by its express language; in other words,
to a "criminal case upon conviction after trial" and has no applica-
tion to the Juvenile Court Processes. For the court to so hold
would further the policy set out in section 503 of the California
Welfare and Institutions Code and those cases construing that
section.20 Unfortunately, that concept has turned out to be an ex-
cuse often used to cover up the abuses of the system.21 Recent cases
have demonstrated that the courts are no longer willing to use the
"civil in nature" distinction as a rationale for denying juveniles pro-
cedural protections.22
The Court of Appeals held that to restrict the application of Rule
250 to cases coming under the general criminal law would deny the
minor equal protection of the law. The Court noted that the
Judicial Council, subsequent to this Petitioner's hearing, added
16. In re J., 26 Cal. App.3d 768, 771, 103 Cal. Rptr. 21, 23 (1972); cf.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601
(1971); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAV. L. REv. 1065(1969).
18. Id., 36 Cal. 3d at 939, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 91.
19. CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 503:
An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court
shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor
shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal pro-
ceeding.
People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1967); G.
v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App.3d 572, 106 Cal. Rptr. 505; cf. In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. See CAL. WELF. AIM INST. CODE, § 503.
21. Cf. People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 432 P.2d 202, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1967) (dissenting opinion); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. See, supra note 2. But see McKiever v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528
(1971) (denying juveniles the right to a trial by jury).
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Rule 251,23 giving juveniles the same procedural protections. This
action was construed as giving "tacit approval" to the approach
taken by the court in In re N. The Court thus followed closely
the trend established by the Appellate Courts in other recent juve-
nile cases. 24 Yet, unless there is broad legislative reform of Cali-
fornia's Juvenile Court Processes, it appears that such progress will
continue only through a case by case application to the juvenile of
those procedural protections guaranteed the adult offender.2 5
JoHN H. PAULSEN
23. Cal. Ct. R. 251 (1973).
24. See, supra note 2.
25. See, In re William F., - Cal.Sd -, 520 P.2d 986, 113 Cal. Rptr. 170
(1974) (and dissenting opinion).
